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Watsuji Tetsuro (1889-1960) is usually juxtaposed in stature and impor­
tance with Nishida Kitard (1870-1945), the initiator of the Kyoto school, the 
two being regarded as the most representative thinkers of modern Japan. 
While some of Nishida’s works and those belonging to the Kyoto school have 
in recent years generated a mild interest among those scholars who are adven­
turous in thought (thanks largely to such able translators and commentators 
as David A. Dilworth, James W. Heisig, and Jan Van Bragt), Watsuji’s name 
has remained virtually unknown except in Japan, although some may be 
familiar with his other translated book, Climate (Fado H,±). With the transla­
tion of his Ethics (Rinrigaku now available in English, Watsuji will
gain recognition, I hope, as a first-rate thinker just as praiseworthy as Nishida 
was a world-class philosopher. William LaFleur, for instance, notes that Wa- 
tsuji’s Ethics is “ the major such effort by an Asian thinker in the twentieth cen­
tury” (p. vii), and this is not an isolated instance of the value of his Ethics.
Following these preliminary remarks, I would like to outline this review, in 
which I will 1) provide a sketch of what I judge to be the main philosophical 
contention of Watsuji’s Ethics, though touching only the bare bones of its 
multifaceted dimensions, 2) critique his philosophical position, and 3) com­
ment on the translation.
Watsuji presents his Ethics, his magnum opus, as a kind of philosophical an­
thropology, although his study does not delve into, and hence is not built 
upon, such terms as anthrOpos, homo, Mensch, and man, all of which carry, 
in one sense or other, the meaning of individual person. Instead, his inquiry 
thematizes a “ betweenness” (aidagara) arising from the practical, actional 
connection between person and person in the dynamic spread of lived-space 
and time. Hence, he presents his thesis as antithetical to all ethical theories 
based on the analysis of the individual person in isolation. He makes this 
point clear in the opening statement of his Ethics: “ A primary significance of 
defining ethics as the study of the human being[-in-betweenness] is to become
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free from the modem error that regards ethics simply as an issue relating to in­
dividual consciousness” (p. 9 ).1
Throughout his work Watsuji mounts numerous arguments to demonstrate 
this point whenever he advances and elaborates his own thesis of betweenness. 
A few examples will suffice here. Modem philosophers in general use individ­
ual consciousness as a starting point for thematic inquiries into ethics, but 
Watsuji points out that in order to complete a system, he/she must, in the 
end, appeal to such concepts as the “ transpersonal self, the happiness of soci­
ety, and the welfare of humankind” (p. 10), viz., to ideas that transcend in­
dividual consciousness. This demonstrates that the use of individual conscious­
ness is inadequate, hence is not comprehensive enough to address the issues of 
ethics. Theoretically, Watsuji reasons that an isolated individual conscious­
ness, as in Descartes’ cogito, implicitly presupposes the existence of another 
cogito, i.e., when Descartes wrote, “ Cogito, ergo sum,”  he assumed a writer­
reader relationship. In other words, Descartes’ cogito is an artificial, intellec­
tual abstraction out of this relationship, without which it is meaningless to 
declare, “ Cogito, ergo sum.”  This also holds true, for example, with Husserl, 
who thematized intentionality as issuing from an individual. However, Watsu­
ji observes that “ my”  intentionality is mutually defined by another’s intention­
ality: the way “ I”  look at the other is defined by the way the other looks at 
“ me” and vice versa. The act of transcendence effected by “ my” looking at 
the other is transcended by the way the other looks at “ me,”  which is the 
point Sartre also makes, by characterizing it as “ transcendence transcended.” 
From these examples, Watsuji concludes that consciousness is actually a con­
sciousness of the betweenness between person and person (see, for example, 
pp. 31 and 77), All these mistakes, he argues, arise as a consequence of utiliz­
ing the methodological stance of “ contemplating nature”  as if it could be 
equally applicable to the human being-in-betweenness. Therefore, Watsuji 
maintains that, in order to understand ethics correctly, one must study the hu­
man beings-in-betweenness.
As may be apparent from the preceding examples, Watsuji rejects the 
methodological stance of theoretical “ reasoning” that aims at a manipulation 
of concepts which is devoid of practical, actional meaning. Instead, he relies 
on Dilthey’s hermeneutics of “ understanding,” particularly focusing on the 
meaning of “ expression” (hyOgen as generated out of the living dynam­
ism that the incarnate subject (shutai £ # )  exhibits in the matrix of be­
tweenness, wt|ere the matrix of betweenness, for Watsuji, unfolds in and 
through the standpoint of everydayness. For this reason, he takes the
1 The passages cited in the following may differ slightly from the translated version.
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everyday fact as a starting point o f his inquiry. Because he applies this 
methodological stance to the Japanese cultural-historical context and its ex­
pression, his Ethics is often characterized as a Japanese, or more broadly, an 
East-Asian systematization o f ethics, which finds its origin, in spirit, in the ar­
ticulation o f the classical Confucian tradition. This characterization is also ex­
emplified by the fact that he problematizes the issues o f  ethics through the her­
meneutical analysis o f various Japanese words, such as ningen, sonzai, and 
rin ri, whose meanings have been sedimented within the Japanese cultural- 
historical context in order to establish “ the principle o f ethics.”  Conse­
quently, his philosophical position reflects this orientation. Because o f this 
orientation, W atsuji’s Ethics was criticized in the past as conservative by 
Marxist intellectuals in Japan, who thought Marxism was ideologically su­
perior to  traditional Japanese values.
As an illustration o f the above point, consider the Japanese term, ningen 
A M , which Watsuji employs as one o f the key terms in  developing his ethical 
system. I t  is usually understood to  mean a human, a person, or a man (in the 
generic sense), but Watsuji hermeneutically shows that ningen means “ being 
in the midst o f  the [inter-generationally, spatially lived) world as well as a per­
son in that w orld”  (p. 15). This is because the term gen M , comprising the sec­
ond ha lf o f the compound ningen, means “ betweenness,”  which in W atsuji’s 
Ethics, connotes a lived, spatial-temporal spread that is generated out o f  the 
living dynamism o f actional, practical connection. This being the case, Watsu­
j i  states that “ it  [i.e., ningen: the human being-in-betweenness] does not sim­
ply designate a person, nor does it simply mean a ‘society’ , wherein we can 
discern a dialectical synthesis o f the dual character o f ningen”  (p. 15). He 
elaborates this dual character o f the human being-in-betweenness in terms o f 
the relationship between an individual and the whole, where the whole may be 
a fam ily, a group o f friends, a community, a God or a nation. According to 
his analysis, an individual is simply a dialectical moment; it  exists only when 
negating the whole, by wearing a duster o f personas. On the other hand, the 
whole is also a dialectical moment; it exists only when negating the individual. 
An individual or the whole is an expression o f this negation in the dialectical 
process; neither an individual nor the whole can exist on its own. In W atsuji’s 
ethical scheme, then, negation becomes “ the fundamental structure o f the hu­
man being-in-betweenness.”
Watsuji further analyzes the structure o f  negation involving these two dialec­
tical moments o f  the individual and the whole. His analysis is primarily intend­
ed to  articulate philosophically the “ fundamental principle o f  ethics”  that 
governs the human being-in-betweenness, and derivatively to refute ethics 
based on the analysis o f an isolated individual. In discussing the idea o f the 
whole, Watsuji makes a distinction between a finite whole and the absolute
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whole: a finite whole designates various kinds of betweenness realized through 
the union of a multiplicity of individuals, whereas the absolute whole is that 
which hierarchically subsumes various finite wholes. Our concern here is Wa- 
tsuji’s understanding of the absolute whole. He defines the absolute whole as 
“ aris[ing] only in the undifferentiation of the differentiated individual. It is the 
realization of nondiscrimination that transcends the multiplicity of individ­
uals. It negates the distinction between discrimination and nondiscrimination, 
and as such is the absolute negation”  (p. 99). Borrowing Nagflrjuna’s ter­
minology, Watsuji calls the absolute whole qua absolute negation, “ empti­
ness.”  He introduces the idea of emptiness in his Ethics as the primordial 
ground sine qua non for theoretically conceiving and practically realizing a 
nondual relationship between an “ I”  and the other, because for the actualiza­
tion of such a relationship, an “ I”  and the other must be separated by abso­
lutely nothing. Watsuji uses this as a theoretical basis for “ a synthesis between 
difference and identity . . . within a finite whole” (p. 99). As such, it is “ the 
foundation for every finite whole.”
On the other hand, the individual, having a status of an individual through 
the negation of the whole, becomes individualistic when he or she separates 
himself or herself from the whole to which he or she belongs, in the form of a 
rebellion against it or simply by leaving it. Watsuji takes this individual's act 
of separation from the whole as an actional instance of the negation of the 
whole, and ultimately this negation is a negation of emptiness, i.e., the abso­
lute whole, which is for Watsuji the primordial origin, and the source of 
authenticity. This negation takes the form of individuals “ empty[ingl them­
selves in various manners, immersfing] themselves into an incarnate subjective 
whole, that is, the negation must be actualized within each individual's incar­
nate subjectivity” (p. 117). Here we witness Watsuji*s program for individua­
tion, i.e., to become an in-divisible whole. Logically, Watsuji’s individual, 
then, comes to be defined as the “ negation of negation,” which he says is no 
other than an “ absolute negation.”  However, since the individual cannot be 
an isolated individual in Watsuji's ethical scheme (because of its dialectical 
relationship to the whole in terms of betweenness), such an individual must 
return to society (i.e., the whole), and eventually to the absolute whole qua 
emptiness. Here, what he has in mind are such exemplary acts as self-sacrifice 
and selfless action. Although the degree of “ emptying oneself”  may vary from 
individual to individual, Watsuji thinks this returning to society is tantamount 
to returning to “ emptiness,”  because “ that which is a whole for the human 
being-in-betweenness is formed only insofar as this emptiness is realized in the 
betweenness of individual persons”  (p. 99). In this manner, Watsuji grounds 
both the individual and the whole in “ emptiness”  as their foundation, such 
that, seen from the standpoint of emptiness, an individual is the “ self-move-
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ment of absolute negation”  (p. 186). This he calls the “ fundamental principle 
of ethics.’’ He states: “ The negative structure of human existence is the law of 
fundamental patternment which enables the human existence-in-betweenness 
to form itself as the human existence-in-betweenness. If the human being­
in-betweenness deviates from this law, it is no longer capable of existing” 
(p. 117).
The dialectical movement for the human being-in-betweenness involves “ a 
constant movement from the already existing betweenness to a possible be­
tweenness” (p. 186). And this constant movement is a “ returning to its authen­
ticity by realizing that which is communal vis-^-vis the negation of individuali­
ty”  (p. 186), where authenticity for Watsuji means the primoridal ground 
“ out of which we all come,” that is, we are fundamentally grounded in empti­
ness. This means for Watsuji that “ the already existing betweenness ultimate­
ly means an absolute whole of nonduality between the self and the other. It is 
the ‘original face before one’s father and mother were born’ ” (p. 186), which 
is itself a Zen expression designating a state prior to the bifurcation between 
subject and object. By realizing the nonduality between an “ I”  and the other 
even in the possible betweenness, Watsuji says, we “ return to the original, 
authentic home.”
Watsuji’s idea of authenticity finds its way into his Ethics through Heideg­
ger’s influence, for he wrote this work in part as a polemical response to the lat­
ter’s Being and Time. Here, it might not be inappropriate to present Watsuji’s 
criticisms of Heidegger’s work,2 particularly the latter’s concept of authentici­
ty. In Watsuji’s ethical scheme, where the betweenness of an “ I”  and the 
other is held to be nondual through the mediation of emptiness, what Heideg­
ger called “ authentic” turns out to be inauthentic. Watsuji criticizes Heideg­
ger’s analysis of Dasein as confined primarily to personal existence. Personal 
existence gains its status as existence only in opposition to the other, and as 
such it is the negation of the wholeness of the human being-in-betweenness. 
However, for Watsuji, living nondual betweenness is authentic, and personal 
existence returns to this ground of authenticity via self-negation. Heidegger’s 
authenticity is inauthentic precisely because it deviates from nondual be­
tweenness (p. 225).
This criticism is clearly derived from Watsuji’s placing priority upon the 
whole in his ethical system, namely, the absolute whole qua emptiness. Watsu­
ji reasons that human existence is stamped with a contingent character, i.e., it
2 Watsuji criticizes Heidegger as placing a one-sided, hence, undue emphasis on tem­
porality, almost to the exclusion o f  spatiality in his pursuit o f  understanding Dasein *s 
ontological structure.
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is determined by given historical, cultural and climatic conditions. An individ­
ual is “ thrown,” to use Heidegger’s terminology, into an already existing net­
work of betweenness. This has the implication for Watsuji that the individual 
does not determine the nature of the betweenness, but rather the whole vis-A- 
vis the betweenness determines the individual. For example, in a father-child 
betweenness, a father becomes a father to the degree to which he fulfils his 
responsibility as a father to his child, wherein the truth of this betweenness is 
assessed in terms of the degree to which trust and sincerity are expressed. For 
Watsuji, this means that one who fails to fulfil one’s responsibility is not a hu­
man, i.e., as in the example used here, in the capacity of a father. By virtue of 
this priority of the whole over the individual, he argues that ethics means an 
order or rule stipulated by the nature of betweenness in order to govern and to 
regulate a multiplicity of individuals (rinri; ethics).
Now, I would like to offer a few remarks concerning the shortcomings of 
Watsuji’s Ethics. The first point concerns his failure to thoroughly observe his 
methodological standpoint. The second point, which is an extension of the 
first, is related to  his position of the whole taking priority over the individual.
Watsuji takes the everyday fact as a starting point of his inquiry, but he 
does not limit his investigation to this standpoint. This becomes especially evi­
dent when he defines authenticity as the nondual relationship between the “ I” 
and the other vis-A-vis the idea of absolute negation or “ emptiness.”  It seems 
that Watsuji’s “ emptiness”  remains a metaphysical postulate, for in the stand­
point of everydayness no experiential correlate to this idea is found. It occurs 
only through the transformation of the everyday standpoint by means of 
rigorous, religious self-cultivation. Watsuji’s “ human being-in-betweenness” 
knows little of this experiential dimension. Hence, when he mentions the non­
dual relationship between the “ I”  and the other as the ground of authenticity, 
he is only pointing to an ideal relationship. From a broad perspective, this 
shortcoming arises because Watsuji subsumes religion under the nation in his 
hierarchical ethical system.
The second criticism concerns Watsuji’s placing priority of the whole over 
the individual. In his enthusiasm for refuting individually oriented ethics, he 
overemphasizes the significance of the whole without paying equal attention 
to the depths of the experience which the incarnate subject undergoes in life. 
This is evident in his treatment of “ the structure of temporality”  and “ the 
structure of spatiality,”  where he prioritizes the public dimension of these 
structures. However, both temporality and spatiality are grounded first in the 
experience of the individual, incarnate subject. Watsuji ignores this point. 
This is particularly evident when he thematizes the phenomenon of death. In 
his Ethics, death occurs to someone else, not to oneself,3 where Watsuji 
remains simply as an observer.
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The present translation by Yamamoto Seisaku and Robert E. Carter com­
prises roughly one-third of the original version that appeared in three volumes 
between 1937 and 1949. It is a momentous achievement, the fruit of a coopera­
tive endeavor spanning more than eight long years. I celebrate this translation, 
first because both Yamamoto and Carter have generally succeeded in present­
ing Watsuji’s philosophical point, argument and position very clearly, while 
reflecting Watsuji’s lucid style of writing. I have one small regret to express, 
however. Watsuji’s use of the Japanese language is at times so skillful that it 
seems to me his philosophical language defies rendering into equally powerful 
and precise English counterparts (e.g.» both shutaiteki ± # 6 9  and shukanteki 
±W69 are translated as “ subjective,”  and there are also inconsistencies in the 
translation of ningen AM and ningen sonzai AM #$E). For this reason, the 
translation would have benefited from a more extensive treatment of these 
terms in the footnotes, while being sensitive to Watsuji’s influence from Euro­
pean thinkers (e.g., Husserl’s “ natural standpoint”  is translated as “ natural 
level” ).
The timeliness of this translation, however, is not to be undermined by the 
many linguistic and philological concerns, especially given the current situa­
tion in North American societies where the media reports almost daily various 
forms of social deterioration and disorientation (e.g., crime and drugs). I won­
der if this is due to an overemphasis on the individual and material wealth, to 
the total neglect of Watsuji’s “ betweenness.”  Consequently, it appears to me 
that a “ flattening”  of all values toward the singular goal of individual mone­
tary wealth has taken possession of the people’s minds and infiltrated the vital 
structure of society. Watsuji’s Ethics will provide intellectuals with an occa­
sion to reflect upon the present social condition, and perhaps lend some impe­
tus to correct the imbalance and restore order, and even move toward the 
globalization of the world.
3 See Yuasa Yasuo, Watsuji TetsurO: Kindai Nihontetsugaku no unmei [Watsuji Te- 
tsurO: The Destiny of Modern Japanese Philosophy] (Tokyo: Chikuma shobO, 1995), 
p. 352.
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